有为高管、过度自信CEO与股价崩盘风险--合谋观与制衡观

Promising Executives, Overconfident CEOs and Stock Price Crash Risk:Collusion View or Balance View

CEO与管理层属于有机整体,二者既存在制衡关系,又可能发生合谋。根据合谋观,CEO处于科层结构顶端,容易成为高管团队拉关系、迎合的对象,极大地削弱异质性团队资源多样性的优势,对于过度自信CEO非理性行为积极响应。根据制衡观,有为管理者基于自身优势、个体意识以及价值观驱动,尽可能地发挥自己管理才能,避免过度自信CEO的非理性行为带来的后果。因此,亟待检验有为高管究竟对过度自信CEO与股价崩盘风险之间的关系如何发挥作用。将过度自信CEO与有为高管视为有机整体,将高管团队能力引入CEO过度自信与股价崩盘风险关系分析框架,选取2007年至2017年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,构建多元回归模型,实证检验有为高管和过度自信CEO对于股价崩盘风险的影响,探讨有为高管对于过度自信CEO究竟是发挥制衡作用还是合谋效应。并从上市公司战略选择、非效率投资、运营效率和管理层权力4个维度,识别有为高管和过度自信CEO发挥作用的经营环境。研究结果表明,过度自信CEO会加剧公司股价崩盘风险,而有为高管有助于抑制过度自信CEO对于股价崩盘风险的负向影响,验证了有为高管制衡观;CEO过度自信在进攻型战略下更可能加剧公司股价崩盘风险,相应的,有为高管有助于抑制进攻型战略公司CEO过度自信对股价崩盘风险的负向影响;CEO过度自信在非效率投资公司更可能加剧公司股价崩盘风险,相应的,有为高管有助于抑制非效率投资公司CEO过度自信对于股价崩盘风险的负向影响;有为高管在高营运效率公司更能发挥制衡作用,从而高营运效率公司的有为高管更有助于抑制CEO过度自信对股价崩盘风险的负向影响;有为高管在管理层权力高的公司更能发挥制衡作用,从而管理层权力高的公司的有为高管更有助于抑制CEO过度自信对股价崩盘风险的负向影响。研究结果丰富了高管团队对于股价崩盘风险影响的研究,构建了过度自信CEO与有为高管为整体的理论分析框架。

As an organic whole, the CEO and the executive can be either balanced or colluded. According to the “collusion view,” the CEO is at the top of the bureaucratic structure. They can easily become the target for other executives to build relationships and flatter, which greatly reduces the advantages of heterogeneous teams. As a result, the executives respond positively to the irrational actions of overconfident CEOs. According to the “balance view,” driven by their own resource advantages, awareness and sense of values, promising executives will exert their efforts as much as possible to avoid the negative consequences led by overconfident CEO′s irrational actions. Therefore, it is urgent to investigate the role of promising executives in the relationship between overconfidence CEO and the stock price crash risk.In this study, overconfidence CEO and promising executives are regarded as an organic whole, and the ability of executive team is introduced into the analysis framework of the relationship between overconfidence CEO and stock price crash risk.Taking A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as the research sample, this study constructs a multiple regression model to empirically test the impact of promising executives and overconfident CEOs on the risk of stock price crash. This study further discusses whether the promising executives play the counterbalance or complicity effect on the overconfident CEO. Then we also identify the business environment for executives to play a role from four dimensions, namely, strategic choice, inefficient investment, operational efficiency and management power.The results are as follows:(1) the overconfident CEO will increase the risk of stock price crash, while promising executives will help to restrain the influence of overconfident CEO on the risk of stock price crash, thus verifying the “balance view”.(2) The overconfident CEO of the aggressive strategic company is more likely to increase the risk of stock price crash. Accordingly, the aggressive strategic company′s promising executives are more likely to restrain the influence of overconfident CEO on the risk of stock price crash.(3) The overconfident CEO in the inefficient investment company is more likely to increase the risk of stock price crash. Accordingly, the inefficient investment company′s promising executives are more likely to restrain the influence of overconfident CEO on the risk of stock price crash.(4) The promising executives can play a more balanced role in high efficiency companies, so the promising executives of high efficiency companies are more helpful to restrain the influence of CEO overconfidence on the risk of stock price crash.(5) The promising executives can play a more balanced role in high management power companies, so the promising executives of high management power companies are more helpful to restrain the influence of CEO overconfidence on the risk of stock price crash.The results help to enrich the research on the influence of the executive team on stock price crash risk, and construct an integrated theoretical framework of overconfident CEO and promising executive as well.