资本化研发支出减值传递了什么信号?

What Signal Does Impairment of Capitalized R&D Convey?

研究以2007-2019年进行过研发支出资本化的A股上市公司为对象,从上市公司、外部投资者和交易所监管者三个维度,对开发支出减值的经济后果进行了检验。结果显示开发支出减值传递了开发支出质量较低的信号,监管者能在减值年度有效接收信号并发放含相关问题的年报问询函进行监管,但投资者未能正确解读减值信号。进一步分析发现减值计提并未达到提升开发支出质量的目的,而信息环境优化有助于投资者正确接收开发支出减值所蕴含的信息。以上发现对于研发支出资本化会计准则的细化完善、开发支出减值机会主义行为的治理、资本市场对开发支出信息解读和吸收效率的提升等,具有一定的借鉴意义。

Using samples of R&D capitalized A-share listed companies in China,this paper investigate the economic consequences of impairment,from the perspectives of listed companies,outside investors and regulators from stock exchanges.We find that impairment of capitalized R&D conveys the signal of low-quality capitalized R&D.The regulators effectively receive the signal and send relevant annual report inquiry letters to impaired firms,while average investors are not capable of understanding the information hidden in capitalized R&D.Further analysis show that impairment cannot show true value of capitalized R&D.Better information environment is helpful in improving investors understanding of the low-quality signal in capitalized R&D.Our results provide evidences on inappropriate R&D capitalization policies,and have implications on accounting standard setting,regulation of opportunistic impairment behaviors,as well as improvement of capital market in absorption and reflection of capitalized R&D information.