非行政处罚性监管与企业投资效率——基于交易所问询函的经验证据

Non-Administrative Penalty Supervision and Enterprise Investment Efficiency:Evidence from the Stock Exchange Comment Letters

自信息披露直通车改革后,非行政处罚性监管——交易所问询函逐渐成为我国监管机构的重要监管措施。本文以2014—2018年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验收到问询函对于上市公司投资效率的影响。研究结果表明,相比于未收到问询函的上市公司,收到问询函的上市公司投资效率更低,且收到问询函的次数越多,上市公司投资效率越低。进一步研究发现,法律风险和问询函问题分类会影响问询函与投资效率之间的关系,基于中介效应检验的影响机制研究表明问询函能够加剧企业融资约束,降低现金持有水平,从而导致企业投资不足,降低企业投资效率。结论意味着交易所问询函能够对企业投资效率发挥作用,丰富了问询函经济后果的相关研究。

Since the direct channel for information disclosure implemented,nonadministrative punitive supervision—the stock exchange comment letter has become an important regulatory measure for China's regulatory authorities.Based on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in 2014-2018 comment letters of the listed companies,we test the influence of receiving comment letters on the investment efficiency of listed companies,the results show that compared with the enterprises that did not receive the comment letters,the enterprises that received the comment letters were less efficient in investment,and the more comment letters that the enterprise received,the lower the investment efficiency of the listed companies.Further research finds that litigation risk and question classification of comment letters will affect the relationship between comment letters and investment effi-ciency.Based on the influence mechanism of intermediary effect test,the research shows that comment letters can intensify the financing constraints of enterprises,reduce the level of cash holdings,which will lead to insufficient investment and thus reduce the investment efficiency of enterprises.The conclusion means that the comment letters of the stock exchange can play a role in the efficiency of investment efficiency of enterprises,which enriches the relevant research on the economic consequences of the comment letters.