政企联合储备应急物资的激励决策

Incentive Decision of Government-Enterprise Joint Reserve of Emergency Supplies

政企联合储备应急物资能有效缓解应急物资储备不足的困境,而代储供应商间的优势互补有助于提升应急物资储备水平。为激励企业积极参与储备应急物资,在政企委托代理关系的基础上,引入了供应商间的合作关系,构建了应急物资储备激励模型。进一步,推导分析了供应商分散合作及柔性合作下的政企决策策略,开展了参数灵敏性分析及数值分析,讨论了若干重要变量对政企最优决策及储备量的影响,并由此得到管理启示。研究结果表明:基于单纯储备收益分成的代储供应商间难以实现最优协作,确立合理的柔性合作可同时增强政企、供应商间合作关系,更好地激励供应商的参与积极性,提升储备库存和储备效率。

A joint reserve of emergency supplies by the government and the enterprise can effectively alleviate the problem of insufficient emergency supply reserves. Additionally, the complementary advantages of a storage supplier can help improve emergency materials reserves. To encourage enterprises to actively participate in emergency supply reserves, this paper designs a cooperative relationship based on the government-enterprise principal-agent relationship and develops an incentive model. Furthermore, it analyzes decision-making strategies of the government and enterprises for decentralized and flexible cooperation with suppliers, performs parameter sensitivity and numerical analyses, and discusses the influence of key variables on optimal decision-making and management of reserves. The results show that it is difficult to achieve optimal cooperation among proxy storage suppliers based on pure reserve revenue sharing. However, establishing reasonable flexible cooperation can simultaneously enhance cooperative relationships between government, enterprise, and suppliers, and better motivate suppliers to participate.