未来人伦理学的理论挑战及其回应——以伤害观为中心的考察

A Theoretical Challenge to the Ethics of Future People and Its Responses: An Analysis Centered on the Concept of Harm

帕菲特的非同一性问题对未来人伦理学提出了挑战,如何回应这一挑战成了学术界的重要任务。非同一性问题之所以难以解决,主要是它依赖一种比较性的伤害观。依据比较性的伤害观,我们就难以证明当代人伤害了未来人。与此相对,非比较性伤害观可能会提供一种比较好的解决思路。非同一性问题可以分为个体的非同一性问题和集体的非同一性问题,帕菲特即使成功论证了个体的非同一性情境中不存在伤害,但并不能直接推导出集体的非同一性情境不存在伤害。总之,非同一性问题难以否定我们对未来人的伤害及所应承担的责任。

Parfit’s non-identity problem poses a challenge to the ethics of future people, and how to respond to this challenge has become an important task for scholars. Non-identity problem is hard to solve mainly because it relies on a comparative account of harm. However, a non-comparative account of harm may provide a better solution. In addition, non-identity problem can be divided into individual non-identity problem and collective non-identity problem. Even Parfit successfully proved that there is no harm in individual non-identity situation, he could not directly conclude that there is no harm in collective non-identity situation. In short, non-identity problem is difficult to deny the harm we do to future people and the responsibility we should bear.