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生成进路下人工智能的道德主体地位 被引量:8

Artificial Intelligence’s Moral Agency Under the Enactive Approach
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摘要 人工智能道德主体地位的确立会撼动现代社会法律及伦理秩序。学术界对人工智能道德主体地位以意向为轴的多元主张仍存在内在张力。生成进路通过“道德知觉”、有机图式分别对道德主体中的道德来源、道德目的进行建构,以强调心智与生命在道德主体形塑过程中的不可或缺性,确立了能感入他者道德世界的公共世界之非自我中心物及时间性的存在者才有资格成为道德主体。基于认知科学的生成进路道德观继承了该进路试图在心智与生命间的解释鸿沟上取得进展的传统,与离身的精神及无意的行为进行二分,提出了整合心智与生命的“道德知觉-有机图式”的道德观,这是一种与古典进路和具身进路相区别的生成进路的人工智能道德主体考量标准。 The establishment of artificial intelligence’s moral agency will greatly influence the laws and ethics of modern society. There are still inherent tensions in the academic community, regarding the multiple propositions on AI’s moral agency where the intent plays a core part. The enactive approach constructs the agent’s source and intent of morality based on “moral perception” and organic schemas, which emphasizes the indispensability of the mind and the lived body in shaping moral agents. Going further, it confirms that only those beings rooted in time and non-egocentric in the common world, who can perceive the moral world of the other, are qualified to be moral agents. Based on cognitive science, this enactive approach to morality inherits its tradition of trying to bridge the explanatory gap between mind and life, and separates the disembodied spirit and unintentional behavior. More importantly, it puts forward the standard of “moral perception-organic schemas”, which is different from the classical approach and embodied approach, to address the consideration of AI’s moral agents.
作者 代欣玲 彭小兵 程鹏 DAI Xin-ling;PENG Xiao-bing;CHENG Peng(School of Public Policy and Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044;School of Marxism,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)
出处 《自然辩证法研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第8期35-42,共8页 Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金 国家社会科学基金“社会力量参与重大突发公共卫生事件应急管理的‘三社联动’机制研究”(20VYJ031) 中央高校基本科研业务费“基于多主体合作博弈的基层治理共同体构建及其在社区防疫中的应用研究”(2022CDJSKPY23)。
关键词 生成进路 人工智能 道德主体 道德知觉 有机论 enactive approach artificial intelligence moral agent moral perception organicism
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