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政府参与下零担企业参与共同配送的三方演化博弈 被引量:2

Tripartite Evolutionary Game in which Less-than-load Enterprises Participate in Joint Distribution under the Participation of Government
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摘要 当前经济发展、产业升级对物流业提出了新要求,而国内零担运输业存在各企业恶性竞争的问题。基于此,建立政府、零担货运企业和另一零担货运企业的三方演化博弈模型,对各利益主体的演化路径和策略稳定性进行分析,并利用MATLAB软件进行数值仿真,讨论模型中不同参数对策略选择的影响。结果表明:政府选择监管投入的成本对选择监管策略起负效应;政府的奖惩都促进企业选择合作策略;收益、成本、风险对演化达到理想状态产生重要影响。 The economic development and industrial upgrading have put forward new requirements for the logistics industry,while the domestic truckload transport industry faces the problem of vicious competition among enterprises.Based on this,the tripartite evolution game model of government,less-than-truckload freight enterprise and another zero-truckload freight enterprise is established,the evolution path and strategy stability of each stakeholder are analyzed,and numerical simulation is carried out by using MATLAB software to discuss the influence of different parameters in the model on strategy choice.The results show that the cost of government choice of regulatory input has a negative effect on the choice of regulatory strategy;government rewards and punishments promote enterprises to choose cooperative strategy;income,cost and risk have important impact on the evolution to an ideal state.
作者 杨晨曦 YANG Chenxi(School of Transportation,Lanzhou Jiaotong University,Lanzhou 730070,China)
出处 《科技和产业》 2022年第9期72-80,共9页 Science Technology and Industry
关键词 共同配送 演化博弈 决策行为分析 仿真分析 joint distribution evolutionary game decision-making behavior analysis simulation analysis
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