高溢价并购特征与商誉减值及时性——基于并购时管理层过度自信的视角

CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH PREMIUM M&A AND TIMELINESS OF GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT——Based on the Perspective of Management Overconfidence

本文跟踪了并购事件层次商誉从形成到首次减值的过程,并将商誉减值时间和减值风险分为合理减值和延迟减值两部分,通过使用生存分析模型的半参数模型,在一定程度上解决了合理减值时间和风险无法衡量的问题,实证检验了并购特征中的管理层过度自信程度与商誉减值及时性的关系。研究发现,相比于非过度自信的管理层,并购时过度自信的管理层会高估并购溢价,对后续期间的商誉减值风险认知不足,进而延长商誉减值延迟时间、降低商誉减值及时性。本文的研究结果对商誉减值及时性领域做出了有益补充,为有关部门完善商誉减值相关准则和制定商誉减值风险管控政策提供了经验证据。

This paper tracks M&A events from the start time to the time of first impairment.Goodwill duration and impairment hazard can be divided into two parts: the reasonable part and the postponed part.Using the semi-parametric characteristic of the survival analysis model, this paper alleviates the measurement problem about the reasonable part of duration and hazard.This paper empirically studies the relationship between management overconfidence and the timeliness of goodwill impairment.The results show that the overconfident management in M&A will overestimate the M&A premium and underestimate the goodwill impairment risk in the subsequent period, thus prolonging the delay time of goodwill impairment and reducing the timeliness of goodwill impairment.The research results of this paper make a valuable supplement to the field of goodwill impairment timeliness and provide empirical evidence for the relevant departments to improve the standards of goodwill impairment.