意向性与内涵性——意向状态和对意向状态描述的语句

Intentionality and Intensionality——The Intentional States and the Statements Describing Intentional States

意向性与内涵性是心灵哲学和语言哲学的重要概念,二者有一定的联系,但又有所区别。意向性概念从布伦塔诺到塞尔,经历了现象学和分析哲学家们的不同研究和界定,成为心灵哲学中的核心概念。本文从意向性的和内涵性的概念以及内涵性的不可外延特征出发,分析意向性是否有内涵性和外延性。对该概念的区分,校正了中译本中翻译用词的不当之处,对国内学者理解心灵哲学的意向性理论十分重要。

Intentionality and intensionality are important concepts in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and they are somewhat related but distinct. The concept of intentionality has become a primary concept in the philosophy of mind after different studies and definings by philosophers of phenomenology and analytic philosophy from Brentano to Searle. Starting from the concepts of intentional and intensionality and the inextensible character of intensionality, this paper analyzes whether intentionality is intensional or extensional. The distinction of the two concepts is important to correct the improper diction in the translation from English to Chinese, and to understand the theory of intentionality in the philosophy of mind for domestic scholars.