疫情冲击下地方政府与中小型服务企业应对策略的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of local government and small and medium⁃sized service enterprises in response to COVID⁃19 shock

新冠疫情爆发至今,中小型服务企业受到的冲击尤为巨大.以地方政府和中小型服务企业联合发行消费券应对疫情为背景,构建地方政府、中小型服务企业和消费者的三方演化博弈模型,研究政府有偿补贴的影响因子、公信力的影响因子、消费券抵扣金额的影响因子等因素对各利益相关方策略的影响,以期实现地方政府与中小型服务企业良性合作,真正刺激消费,让利于民.结果表明:政府有偿扶持策略下补贴额较低、有偿扶持策略对公信力的影响较大,将促使政府选择对企业进行有偿扶持;企业积极自救策略下所获有偿补贴较高、对消费券抵扣金额较少,企业更愿意坚持积极自救策略;消费券对消费者实际消费额的影响程度较小、积极自救企业对消费券抵扣金额较多,将促使消费者选择持券消费;实施差异化的扶持政策、结合消费券精准发放,可促进经济复苏.

Small and medium⁃sized service enterprises were particularly vulnerable during COVID⁃19.To help them survive the pandemic,local government introduced series of support scheme,such as the vouchers jointly granted by government and small and medium⁃sized service enterprises.This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving local government,small and medium⁃sized service enterprises,and consumers,to study the influen⁃cing factors of paid subsidies,government credibility,and voucher deduction amount on the strategies of each stake⁃holder.The results show that the low subsidy and the paid characteristic of consumer vouchers have a great impact on the government credibility,which will prompt government to choose paid support for enterprises;the enterprises are inclined to choose positive self⁃help strategy due to higher paid subsidies and less deduction for consumption vouchers;that the vouchers hardly influence the actual consumption amount,and the more deductions of consumption vouchers by enterprises of positive self⁃help strategy,will motivate consumers to choose voucher con⁃sumption.It can be concluded that a differentiated support scheme combined with precise delivery of consumption vouchers can promote economic recovery.