流域合作治污与环保宣传动态协调策略

Dynamic coordination strategy of river basin government pollution control and public environmental protection publicity

为提高流域环境治理效果并完善跨行政区流域环境管理机制,采用多主体微分博弈方法,以投入污染治理成本的上游地方政府和进行环保宣传的下游地方政府组成的流域系统为研究对象,研究上、下游地方政府治污减排与环保宣传的合作问题。结果表明:中央政府的补贴政策和地方政府间的生态补偿政策可以有效提升流域环境治理,但提升效果受到地方政府的边际收益等多重因素的影响;科学合理的分配契约可使补偿方与受偿方利益平衡,有利于提高各利益主体进行合作环境治理的积极性;中央政府可以根据不同的博弈策略和收益分配协议,制定差异化的补贴方案,以更好地提升流域环境治理效果。

The fundamental reason for the externality of river basin environmental governance is market failure.The government led ecological compensation mechanism can effectively internalize the externality,which is one of the methods to solve the environmental problems of river basin.This paper takes the basin system composed of the upstream local government and the downstream local government as the research object,and considers that the central government subsidizes the upstream pollution control cost and the downstream local government subsidizes the environmental protection publicity,so as to study the cooperation between the upstream and downstream local governments in pollution control and environmental protection publicity.Then,based on the differential game theory,three game strategies are constructed.The conclusions are drawn as follows.The subsidy policy of the central government can effectively stimulate the enthusiasm of the upstream and downstream local governments to cooperate in pollution control and public environmental protection publicity.It is necessary to make scientific and reasonable distribution contract to balance the interests of the indemnifiers and the indemnitees.The central government can formulate differentiated subsidy schemes according to different game strategies and income distribution agreements,combined with relevant parameters,so as to better improve the effect of basin environmental governance.