党组织嵌入、代理成本与非效率投资——基于国有上市公司的经验证据

Party Organization Embedding, Agency Cost and Non-efficiency Investment——Empirical Evidence from State-owned Listed Companies

基于2013—2020年国有上市公司数据,实证检验了党组织嵌入对非效率投资的影响及路径,并进一步检验了不同制度环境和治理环境的影响。研究发现,党组织嵌入抑制了国有企业的非效率投资,代理成本对党组织嵌入与非效率投资具有部分中介效应。进一步研究发现,制度环境方面,代理成本的中介传导机制在中央国企和董事长兼任党委书记的国企更加显著;治理环境方面,代理成本的中介传导机制在信息透明度高和成长机会好的国企更加显著。研究结论表明,党组织嵌入作为推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的微观经济表现,其治理作用的发挥有益于提升国有企业的投资效率并对经济高质量发展产生积极影响。

Based on the data of state-owned listed companies from 2013 to 2020, this paper empirically tested the influence and the path of Party organization embedding on non-efficient investment, as well as the impact of institutional environment and governance environment. The results show that Party organization embedding restrains non-efficient investment. Agency cost has a partial mediation effect on the Party organization imbedding and non-efficiency investment. Further research shows that, in terms of institutional environment, the mediation transmission mechanism of agency cost is more significant in central state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises where the chairman concurrently holds party secretary. In terms of environmental governance, the mediation transmission mechanism of agency cost is more significant in state-owned enterprises with high information transparency and good growth opportunities. The research conclusion shows that, as the microeconomic performance of promoting the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity, the governance function of Party organization embedding is beneficial to improve the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises and has a positive impact on high-quality economic development.