基于演化博弈视角下契约农业的履约稳定性研究

A Study on the Stability of Performance in Contract Farming Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

在演化博弈视角下,通过构建龙头企业与农户之间的演化博弈模型,分析在不同约束条件下契约双方履约行为的影响逻辑、演化路径及其趋于稳态的阈值,并利用MATLAB模拟不同参数条件下双方博弈的演化路径。结果表明:履约效率随着合作收益的增大而增大;价格波动和机会成本对双方履约效率都具有负向影响;政府补贴和违约处罚的激励与约束作用可有效提高契约的稳定性;只有机会成本、违约罚金和政府补贴的总和大于由市场价格波动产生的额外收益时,博弈双方的合作才会趋于稳定。据此,提出采取“保底收购+随行就市”相结合的方式,实行农产品弹性收购;制定合理的奖惩机制,规范契约双方的履约行为;加大乡村社会诚信体系建设,构建新型乡村社会信任关系等对策,以提升契约农业的履约稳定性,促进契约农业可持续发展。

Based on the perspective of evolutionary game,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model between leading enterprises and farmers,investigates the influence logic,evolutionary path,and threshold value of the contractors′ performance by both parties under different constraints,and simulates the evolutionary path of the game players on both sides under different parameters by MATLAB.The results show that:the performance efficiency of the contract increases with the increasing of cooperative benefits.Both the price fluctuation and opportunity cost produces negative impacts on the performance efficiency of both parties.At the same time,the incentives and constraints of government subsidies and default punishment can effectively improve the performance efficiency of the contract.And only when the sum of opportunity costs,default fine,and government subsidies is greater than the additional income of market price,both parties of contract will eventually stabilize.As a result,in order to improve stability of performance in contract farming and support contract farming′s long-term development,it is proposed to use a combination of ′guaranteed purchase + market-based′ to implement flexible purchasing of agricultural product;to develop reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms,to regulate both parties′ performance;to construct of the rural social integrity system and build a new rural social trust relationship.