基于多次重复博弈的突发公共事件网络舆情演化机理与协同治理

Evolution Mechanism and Collaborative Governance of Network Public Opinion Towards Public Emergencies Based on Multiple Repeated Games

【目的/意义】从参与主体多次博弈角度揭示突发公共事件网络舆情演化机理及治理机制,有助于缩减治理周期和成本,但现有研究对此涉及较少。【设计/方法】首先构建了网络媒体与政府部门的第一次博弈模型,并分析了纳什均衡解及其影响因素;其次,通过考虑主体行为策略的可重复性,将该模型扩展为多次重复博弈模型,并探讨了主体在各次博弈下实现协同合作的条件;最后,以2018年长春长生生物疫苗造假事件引发的网络舆情为例,验证了理论研究的有效性,并考查了舆情传播热度和网媒遭受到的潜在惩罚对博弈均衡的影响。【结论/发现】当网络媒体所获收益的贴现因子不超过某一阈值时,易促进博弈双方长期协同合作;舆情传播热度越小或网媒所受潜在惩罚的力度越大,对长期协同合作的促进作用越显著。

[Purpose/Significance] Revealing the evolution and governance mechanism of network public opinion towards public emergencies from the perspective of multiple games among participants will help to reduce the governance cycle and cost, but few existing studies have been made. [Design/Methodology] The first game model between network media and government is constructed, and the Nash equilibrium solution and its influencing factors are analyzed. Secondly, by considering the repeatability of players’ strategies, the model is extended to the multiple repeated game model, and the conditions for the players to realize cooperation under each game are discussed. Finally, taking the network public opinion caused by the Changchun Changsheng Biological Vaccine Fraud in 2018 as an example, the effectiveness of theoretical research is verified, and the impact of the popularity of public opinion and the potential punishment suffered by network media on the game equilibrium are examined. [Conclusions/Findings] It is easy to promote the long-term cooperation between the players when the discount factor of the income obtained by network media does not exceed a certain threshold;the smaller the popularity of the spread of public opinion or the greater the potential punishment suffered by network media, the better it is to promote the long-term cooperation.