摘要
运用传统儒家“主体—活动”的心性体用论配合释家“本体—功用”的心识体用论,对一种机器人有“心”论所依据的心智“无主体性”与“功能主义”两大理由进行分析,从心智活动的内在主体性及心智功能并不等同体用结合的心智整体之原理来看,两大理由连同其论证逻辑皆不成立,不足以证明机器人可具与人“同一性”之心。从中可得出三点启示:一是反求诸己;二是以心“任物”,人工智能无心而堪用,而用之利弊决乎人心;三是重视机器式“思维”研究。简言之,人需要发挥主体性与自智慧,开发“高级工具理性”。人工智能发展不仅事关科技创新,同时不应忽略从传统心性哲学获取有益资源。
Chinese traditional Confucian“subject-activity”and Buddhist“noumenon-function”theory of mind are used to investigate the two premise reasons of the viewpoint of robots with human mind,which are non-subjectivity and functionalism of mind.It is found that mental activities are of subjectivity,and neither mental functions nor organs can equate to the noumenon-function integrated human mind.Thus the two reasons together with its logic are found defective and the view loses its support.Finally,implications are provided:Firstly,to turn inwards.Secondly,to“control things”with human mind.Artificial intelligence is unintentional but worthy of use,and its pros and cons depend on who use it.Thirdly,to attach more importance to the study of machine-style“thinking”.In short,human beings need to enhance their subjectivity and self-wisdom to develop the“advanced instrumental rationality”.The development of artificial intelligence is not only an issue of technological innovation,but also a chance to cultivate beneficial resources from the traditional philosophy of mind.
作者
张静
ZHANG Jing(School of Humanities,Southeast University,Nanjing 211100,China)
出处
《东北大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第5期9-15,共7页
Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)
关键词
心智
主体性
体用论
人工智能
工具理性
mind
subjectivity
noumenon-function theory
artificial intelligence
instrumental rationality