金融推荐服务的渠道竞争策略研究

Research on Channel Competition Strategy of Financial Recommendation Service

投资者对理财产品的认知能力有限,主要依赖外部“价值信号”形成自己对收益期望的“愿景”,从而简化投资过程。据此,本文通过构建一个新的三方博弈模型研究银行与数字金融平台之间的竞争决策,以探讨当银行有选择其销售顾问能力水平时,如何利用投资者的价值感知和对手特征来占客户对“愿景”错误理解的“便宜”,从而将这种系统性偏差转化为另一种获利来源。研究表明,金融服务强度的有效配置提升了银行的竞争力,但投资者剩余往往被完全剥夺。有趣的是,在同平台竞争中,银行增加了提供金融知识培训的额外动机,并且可能更喜欢强敌而不是弱者。此外,银行应该努力控制服务成本,以规避监管者为防止恶意竞争而禁止银行销售理财产品的风险。

Due to the limited cognitive ability of investors in financial products, they mainly rely on external “value signals” to form their “aspirations” of earnings expectations to simplify the investment process.Thus, financial recommendation service competition is the inevitable result when digital platforms have successfully expanded their business to areas traditionally covered by banks. In this study, a new three-party dual-channel game model is considered where the platform steers investors by recommending firms taking into account both the commissions firms offer and the prices they set, and the bankmakes use of investors’ perception of value and rivals’ characteristics to take advantage of customers’ misunderstanding of “aspirations” by adjusting the sales intensity of financial advisors θ. It is assumed that the naive investors will inspect only the product ranked first by the intermediary, while sophisticated investors will find the financial product with the largest expected revenue on the platform through sequential searches. Based on revenue maximization, all investors decide whether to buy products in either the bank or the platform. Finally, according to the equilibrium solution and numerical analysis, the research shows that the effective allocation of financial service intensity enhances the competitiveness of banks, but the investor surplus is often completely deprived. Interestingly, in the competition with the platform, the bank has added additional motivation to provide financial knowledge literacy, and may prefer a strong rather than a weak enemy. In addition, the bank should attempt to control the cost of services to avoid the risk of regulators blocking the sale of financial products to prevent malicious competition. The model in this paper further confirms that the investors’ perceived value plays a very important role in regulating the bank’s marketing investment and provides various feasible suggestions for the bank looking to implement precision marketing based on data analysis.