考虑额外营销和惩罚成本的垄断企业虚假质量信息研究

Research on Monopolist on the Strategy of Fake Quality Information Considering the Costs of Extra Marketing and Punishment

由于消费者认知水平的差异,在仅以价格作为产品质量信号的市场中,企业与消费者之间存在着信息鸿沟,这为企业使用虚假质量信息提供了空间。因此本文在企业和消费者拥有不对称质量信息的背景下,对企业使用虚假质量信息的问题进行研究。通过差异化产品的消费者效用模型和不同质量信息策略下企业利润模型的构建,探讨企业虚假质量信息的使用策略。随后,引入虚假质量信息的额外营销成本和被发现后的惩罚成本,考虑额外营销成本和惩罚力度对企业虚假质量信息策略的影响。研究发现企业是否使用虚假质量取决于额外营销成本和使用虚假信息后被发现的惩罚成本。对于高、低质量的产品企业倾向于单独使用虚假质量信息,而不会对差异化质量的产品同时使用虚假质量信息。

Consumers always use a product’s price as a signal of the product’s quality.Due to the difference in consumers’perception of product quality,there is an information gap between enterprises and consumers,which provides space for enterprises to use fake quality information.When the product quality information owned by enterprises and consumers is asymmetric,the issue of monopolistic enterprises using fake quality information is studied.By constructing the consumer utility model of differentiated products and the profit model of enterprises under different quality information strategies,the motivation of enterprises using fake quality information is discussed.The extra marketing effort cost and the punishment cost using fake quality information are introduced to see how the different costs will influence the fake quality information strategy of the enterprise.The results show that whether the enterprise uses fake quality information not only depends on the extra marketing cost but also the punishment cost.What’s more,the enterprise prefer to use fake quality information just for high or low quality product rather than for both quality products simultaneously.