概念消去论及其彻底解决

Concept Eliminativism and Its Final Solution

“概念”是认知心理学中一个重要术语。然而哲学家玛歇利认为,术语“概念”不指称自然类,从而不是合法的科学术语,应从心理学中被消去。这种主张被称为“概念消去论”。他的论证存在两个根本性的缺陷:一是对概念的刻画过于限定;二是对术语的理解过于狭隘。因此,概念消去论并没有得到充分辩护。“概念”作为一个内聚于心理学家关注的理论目的的术语,可以被合理地保留。但是,概念消去论向概念研究领域提出了单一概念的结构多样性问题。将概念的内在结构理解为多种认知结构统一于单一语义结构的二重结构,可以为结构多样性提供解释,从而彻底解决概念消去论。

“Concept” is a significant term in cognitive psychology.Machery,the philosopher proposes that the term “concept”,which does not refer to any natural kind,is an improper scientific term and should be eliminated from psychology,and such proposition is referred to as “concept eliminativism”.However,there are two defects within his argument,over-restriction and narrow understanding of the concept,which make “Concept Eliminativism” insufficiently defended.“Concept” as a term cohesive to the theoretical purposes on which psychologists focus can be retained reasonably.But the real challenge from Concept Eliminativism is that one single concept has diverse structures.To regard structures of concepts as two-fold structures in which multiple cognitive structures are unified into one semantic structure can explain the diversity of structures of concepts,thereby finding a final solution to Concept Eliminativism.