行政发包制视角下山西票号与晚清公共财政体系

Reappraisal of Shanxi Piaohao’s Role in Public Finance from the Perspective of Administrative Subcontract

本文应用“行政发包制”(administrative subcontract)这一与中国的历史和现实建立更精确对应关系的政治经济学概念,重新考察山西票号与清政府的关系以及票号在晚清的金融地位,并得出四点结论:第一,票号与清政府的关系是多维度的,不能用简单的“恩庇侍从关系”或“官商”来定义。从同治初年开始,清廷在财税收付过程中是发包人,各省督抚藩运是承包人,而票号则是游离于行政发包制之外的外包役吏。第二,清廷对票号的敌意以及四次请禁汇兑的原因在于行政发包体制下,地方向中央的缴税方式从传统的陆路委解变为经由票号等外包吏役的汇解,从而导致清廷的治理成本和统治风险骤增。第三,各省督抚在中央明令禁止汇解的情况下仍坚持使用票号承汇官款的原因在于,清廷在1895年前始终未能开展围绕建设财税集中收付管理的改革,亦未能对作为称量货币的银两进行统一。第四,山西票号在20世纪初的退市绝非由于其作为清朝的“官商”而走向终结。行政发包制下,发包人的剩余权威和承包人手中的合法伤害权是票号在世纪交替之际退市的主要原因。

The present paper applies administrative subcontract to relations between Shanxi piaohao and Qing and roles played by piaohao in public finance.The relation between piaohao and the Qing is multidimensional instead of clientelism.Since the 1860s,tax transfer and submission from local to central government worked within the framework of administrative subcontract,with the Qing court as the principal,provincial officials as the agents,and piaohao as outsourcing clerks.The central government’s hostility towards piaohao is because piaohao’s remittance business increased the cost and risk of national governance.The reason for provincial officials’persistent reliance on piaohao to submit taxation lies in the Qing’s fiscal decentralization.Piaohao’s withdrawal from the remittance market at the turn of the twentieth century is caused by immense financial losses incurred by the central government’s residual control right and provincial officials’considerable discretion.