绿色信贷政策微观影响效应研究:惩罚还是激励?——对绿色信贷政策波特效应的再检验

Research on the Micro Impact Effect of Green Credit Policy:Punishment or Incentive?——A Re-test of the Porter Effect of Green Credit Policy

本文以2012年原银监会《绿色信贷指引》出台为准自然实验,运用双重差分模型实证检验绿色信贷政策对重污染企业投融资及全要素生产率的影响。研究发现,随着政策的出台,重污染企业投资和负债规模均明显下降,而全要素生产率水平显著提高,说明绿色信贷政策的惩罚效应和波特效应得到了验证。进一步研究发现,绿色信贷政策通过倒逼企业技术创新、降低企业代理成本、提高企业投资效率,进而提升全要素生产率,但该项政策提高了重污染企业融资约束水平,导致全要素生产率的提升受到抑制。异质性研究发现,市场化程度、所有制和企业规模不同,绿色信贷政策影响效果也存在差异。对于市场化程度高的地区、所有制为国有且规模较大的重污染企业,《绿色信贷指引》的出台对投融资的惩罚效应更加明显,但对企业全要素生产率的正向影响更显著。

This paper empirically examines the impact of green credit policies on investment and financing and total factor productivity of heavy polluters using a double difference model in a quasi-natural experiment based on the introduction of the former CBRC’s Green Credit Guidelines in 2012.It is found that with the introduction of the policy,both investment and debt size of heavy polluting enterprises significantly decrease,while total factor productivity level significantly increases,indicating that the penalty effect and Porter effect of green credit policy are verified.Further study finds that the green credit policy improves total factor productivity by forcing firms to innovate technology,reducing their agency costs and improving their investment efficiency,but the policy raises the level of financing constraints for heavy polluters,leading to a dampening of total factor productivity improvement.The heterogeneity study finds that there are differences in the effects of green credit policy impacts depending on the degree of marketization,ownership and enterprise size.For regions with a high degree of marketization and heavy polluters with state-owned ownership and large size,the introduction of the Guidelines has a more pronounced punitive effect on investment and financing,but a more significant positive effect on the total factor productivity of enterprises.