董事高管责任保险、产权性质与会计信息质量——基于沪深A股上市公司的数据

Directors’and Officers’Liability Insurance,Property Rights and the Quality of Accounting Information——Based on the Data of A-share Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen

本文以2004—2018年沪深A股上市公司年度数据为研究样本,实证分析了公司引入董事高管责任保险对会计信息质量的影响,并检验了产权性质差异对董事高管责任保险和会计信息质量之间关系的调节作用。研究结果表明,董事高管责任保险的引入能显著提高企业会计信息质量,且这一作用在国有企业中更显著。进一步研究发现,董事高管责任保险和会计信息质量之间的关系受公司盈利能力、董事会规模及代理成本的影响,表现为盈利能力越好、董事会规模越大或代理成本越高的公司,引入董事高管责任保险越容易提高会计信息质量。作用路径分析结果显示,董事高管责任保险可以通过提高审计费用的渠道提高企业会计信息质量。

Using the annual data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2018 as the research sample,this paper empirically analyzes the impact of the introduction of director’s executive liability insurance by companies on the quality of accounting information,and tests the moderating effect of the difference in the nature of property rights on the relationship between director’s executive liability insurance and the quality of accounting information.The results show that the introduction of directors’and officers’liability insurance can significantly improve the quality of corporate accounting information,and this effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises.Further study finds that the relationship between directors’and officers’liability insurance and accounting information quality is influenced by company profitability,board size and agency costs,showing that companies with better profitability,larger board size or higher agency costs are more likely to improve accounting information quality by introducing directors’and officers’liability insurance.