考虑消费者行为的零售商延保服务策略研究

Extended Warranty Service Strategies of the Retailer Considering Consumer Behaviour

基于消费者对延保服务的不同态度,研究了两个制造商竞争环境下,一个制造商提供捆绑延保服务产品,另一个制造商提供无延保服务单独产品,共同零售商针对单独产品的延保服务策略选择问题。分别探讨零售商不销售延保服务以及销售延保服务下的供应链博弈均衡,分析了零售商延保服务策略对供应链成员利润的影响。研究表明:延保服务单位维修成本较低时,零售商才会选择销售延保服务;零售商延保服务和制造商捆绑延保服务存在竞争时,制造商们竞争加剧会降低批发价格,反之提高批发价格;制造商们只希望零售商在延保服务单位维修成本较高时销售延保服务;单独产品制造商和零售商能够通过一次性支付契约在一定范围内实现帕累托改进。

Based on the different attitudes toward Extended warranty service from consumer,it studies two manufacturers’competitive environments,one manufacturer provides bundled extended warranty service products,the other manufacturer provides individual products without extended warranty service,the co-retailer’s extended warranty service strategy choice for an individual product.This paper discusses the supply chain game equilibrium when the retailer does not sell extended warranty service and sells extended warranty service,and analyzes the impact of the retailer’s extended warranty service strategies on the profits of supply chain members.Research shows that the retailer will only choose to sell extended warranty service when the unit maintenance cost of the extended warranty service is low.When there is competition between the retailer’s extended warranty service and the manufacturer’s bundled extended warranty service,the increased competition among manufacturers will reduce the wholesale price,and conversely increase it.Manufacturers only want the retailer to sell the extended warranty service when the unit maintenance cost is high.The retailer and individual product manufacturers can achieve Pareto improvement to a limited extent through the one-time payment contract.