基于动态博弈的补贴模式对机场群航线网络结构的影响研究

Research on the impact of subsidization on the airline networks of multi-airport systems based on dynamic game theory

为探讨不同补贴模式对机场群航线网络结构的影响,本文构建了关于机场、航空公司和乘客之间的动态博弈模型,通过逆向归纳法得到了纳什均衡条件.研究结果发现:(1)不同的补贴模式对多机场航线网络结构产生重要影响,低补贴模式促使机场群倾向于形成点对点航线网络结构,反之,在高补贴模式下机场群易于形成枢纽辐射航线网络;(2)在较低的空铁联运总运营成本环境下,补贴竞争使得航空公司倾向于选择系统内的大型机场作为枢纽机场;反之,如果空铁联运总运营成本相对较高,补贴竞争使得航空公司倾向于选择小机场作为枢纽节点;(3)随航班固定成本和空铁联运总运营成本的增大,大型机场作为枢纽节点的概率逐渐减少,而小机场被选为枢纽节点的概率将逐渐增大.随着机场群内大型机场腹地服务人口比例的增大,航空公司选择点对点航线网络的概率在减小.研究结论能够为民航管理部门科学制定和应用航线补贴政策提供决策依据.

To discuss the influence of different subsidy modes on the airline networks of multi-airport systems, this paper constructs a dynamic game model between airports, airlines, and passengers.The Nash equilibrium is obtained by analyzing the payoff matrix.The result shows:(1) Different subsidy modes have an important impact on the multi-airport airline network, and the low subsidy promotes the multi-airport system to form a point-to-point network;on the contrary, in the high subsidy mode, the multi-airport system is easy to form a hub-spoke network.(2) If the total operating costs of air-HSR cooperation are relatively low, subsidy competition makes carriers choose large airports in the system as the hub;conversely, if the total operating costs of air-HSR cooperation are relatively high, subsidy competition makes carriers choose small airports as the hub.(3) With the increase in fixed flight costs and total operating costs of air-HSR cooperation, the probability of large airports as hub nodes will gradually decrease, while the probability of small airports being selected as hub nodes will gradually increase.At the same time, as the proportion of the population in large airports increases, the probability of carriers choosing a point-to-point network decreases.The research conclusions can provide a decision-making basis for the industry management department to scientifically formulate and apply the route subsidy policy.