高管薪酬激励、环境信息披露质量与环境绩效——基于中介效应与面板门槛模型

Executive Compensation Incentive,Environmental Information Disclosure Quality and Environmental Performance——Based on the Mediation Effect and Panel Threshold Model

以2015—2020年重污染企业的面板数据为样本,实证检验高管薪酬激励对环境绩效的影响及环境信息披露质量的中介效应和门槛效应。结果表明:①高管薪酬激励有利于环境绩效提升,环境信息披露质量在其中充当中介。②高管薪酬激励对环境绩效的影响存在环境信息披露质量的双重门槛效应,只有环境信息披露质量指数不低于0.292时,高管薪酬激励才显著促进环境绩效;当环境信息披露质量指数超过0.458时,促进作用得到强化。③高管薪酬激励对重污染企业环境绩效的促进作用在东、中、西部地区均成立,但环境信息披露质量的中介作用只在东部地区显著。④相较于中度和轻度污染行业,高管薪酬激励对环境绩效的促进作用只在重度污染行业企业中显著,环境信息披露质量在其中充当中介。

Based on the panel data of listed companies in heavy pollution enterprises from 2015 to 2020,this paper empirically tested the impact of executive compensation incentive on environmental performance,and the mediation effect and threshold effect of environmental information disclosure quality.The results showed that:①Executive compensation incentive were conductive to the improvement of environmental performance,and environmental information disclosure quality acts as a mediator in it.②The impact of executive compensation incentive on the environmental performance had a double threshold effect of environmental information disclosure quality,and only when the index of environmental information disclosure quality was not less than 0.292,executive compensation incentive promoted environmental performance significantly.When it exceeded 0.458,the promotion effect was strengthened.③The role of executive compensation incentive in promoting the environmental performance of heavy pollution enterprises had been established in the Eastern Region,Middle Region and Western Region,but the mediating role of environmental information disclosure quality only existed in the Eastern Region.④Compared with medium and light polluting industries,the promotion effect of executive compensation incentive on environmental performance was only significant in enterprises of heavily polluting industries,and environmental information disclosure quality acts as a mediator.