多企业纵向差异化竞争的博弈分析——局部纳什均衡与全局纳什均衡

Game Analysis of Vertical Differentiated Competition of Multiple Enterprises:Local Nash Equilibrium and Global Nash Equilibrium

在现实世界中,企业不仅通过产品定价进行竞争,而且通过选择产品质量进行竞争。本文构建了一个三企业纵向差异化竞争的博弈模型来分析企业的竞争策略和均衡状态,并区分了全局纳什均衡与局部纳什均衡。研究发现,质量差异最大化策略组合到底构成全局纳什均衡还是局部纳什均衡,取决于成本参数。生产高质量产品的企业和生产低质量产品的企业的利润都受成本参数的影响;当引入最低质量标准时,三家企业的利润都会下降,生产高质量产品的企业会降低产品价格,生产中质量和低质量产品的企业的产品价格变动取决于成本参数的大小。不断提升自身的产品质量是企业长远的生存之道。政府需要通过设置最低质量标准,保护消费者利益。

In the real world, firms compete not only through product pricing but also through their choice of product quality.In this paper, a game model of three-firm vertical differentiation competition is constructed to analyze firms’ competitive strategies and equilibria, and a distinction is made between global Nash equilibrium and local Nash equilibrium.It is found that whether the profile of quality-differentiation maximization strategies constitutes a global Nash equilibrium or a local Nash equilibrium depends on the cost parameters.The profits of both firms producing high-quality products and firms generating low-quality products are affected by the cost parameter;when a minimum quality standard is introduced, the profits of all three firms decline, the firm producing high-quality products reduce its price, and the firms producing the medium and low quality products change their prices depending on the size of the cost parameter.Continuously improving the quality of their products is the way to survive in the long run.The government needs to protect consumer interests by setting minimum quality standards.