从原初协议到道德能力:论罗尔斯公共理性证明之基础

FROM ORIGINAL AGREEMENT TO MORAL POWER: ON THE FOUNDATION OF JUSTIFICATION TO RAWLS’PUBLIC REASON

公共理性是目前引发国内外学术界热烈讨论的一个问题。学者们倾向于将公共理性定义为公民在参与公共生活时所承担的一种义务,那么对这种义务的证明便是必要的。在此方面,罗尔斯提供了一种契约主义式的证明方式,认为公共理性是原初协议下的产物,是公民理性接受的结果。但这种证明显然是不充分的。通过对罗尔斯理论的仔细梳理可知,罗尔斯对公共理性证明依赖的是公民的道德能力,正是因为公民是“理性的”且“合理的”,所以他们才会接受公共理性的约束,在自由平等的基础上进行社会合作。

Public reason has been a heated discussion in academia in China and abroad. Scholars tend to define public reason as a duty undertaken by citizens when they participate in public life, So it is necessary to give a proof to this obligation. In this respect, Rawls provided a kind of proof in the contract view. Public reason as the result of citizens’ rational acceptance is the product of the original agreement. But this proof is clearly inadequate. Through a careful review we can find the Rawls’ proof of public reason relies on the moral power of citizens. because citizens are “rational” and “reasonable”, they will accept the constraints of public reason and carry out social cooperation on the basis of freedom and equality.