低碳农产品供应链的动态博弈策略研究

Research on Dynamic Game Strategy of Low-Carbon Agricultural Product Supply Chain

文章构建了一个涉及政府、制造企业和零售企业在不同权力结构下的合作减排模型。经研究发现,占主要地位的企业能够获得更多的补贴;发展企业间的横向技术研发机制可以减少企业的财政压力,也可以减少政府实施补偿策略的财政压力,并能够提高供应链减排的效果和效率;政府可以根据不同的博弈策略和企业的收益分享协议,制定具有一定差异的补贴方案,实现供应链和环境绩效的帕累托最优。通过比较各模型的最优决策和数字分析,可以得出以下结论:与传统的线下供应链不同,主导者电子平台的利润低于跟随者制造商的利润;当消费者的碳减排弹性系数增加时,服务水平、销售价格、供应链成员利润和系统利润都会增加,最终提高经济和环境绩效;电子平台的利他偏好行为是一种“利润转移”行为,适度的利他主义有利于供应链的稳定运行和长期发展。

The paper constructs a cooperative emission reduction model involving the government,manufacturing enterprises and retail enterprises under different power structures.It is found that the dominant enterprises can get more subsidies.Developing a horizontal technology R & D mechanism among enterprises can reduce the financial pressure of enterprises and the government,s implementation of compensation strategies,and can improve the effect and efficiency of supply chain emission reduction.The government can formulate different subsidy schemes according to different game strategies and profit sharing agreements of enterprises to achieve Pareto optimality of supply chain and environmental performance.By comparing the optimal decision-making and digital analysis of each model,the following conclusions can be drawn:unlike the traditional offline supply chain,the profit of the leader electronic platform is lower than that of the follower manufacturers;When the elasticity coefficient of carbon emission reduction of consumers increases,the service level,sales price,profits of supply chain members and system profits will all increase,ultimately improving economic and environmental performance;The altruistic preference behavior of electronic platforms is a kind of “profit transfer” behavior.Moderate altruism is conducive to the stable operation and long-term development of the supply chain.