无信号路口人车交通演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Pedestrian and Vehicle Traffic at Signalless Intersections

在无信号控制路口,行人与机动车发生冲突时,各自会根据相关信息进行简单的决策后以一定的概率选择通过。在定义行人与机动车的收益博弈矩阵后,建立复制动态方程,并依据演化分析范式,对博弈均衡点的稳定性和演化机理进行分析。

when there is a conflict between pedestrians and motor vehicles at a non signalized intersection,they will make a simple decision according to the relevant information and choose to pass with a certain probability.This paper defines the income game matrix between pedestrians and motor vehicles,establishes the replication dynamic equation,and analyzes the stability and evolution mechanism of the game equilibrium point according to the evolution analysis paradigm.