政府审计能提升国有企业并购重组业绩承诺可靠性吗?——基于审计署央企审计结果公告的经验证据

Can Government Audit Improve the Reliability of Performance Commitment of SOEs M&A?Empirical Evidence Based on the Announcement of Audit Results of Central Enterprises by the National Audit Office

以我国沪深A股中央国有上市公司2012—2020年的数据为样本,将审计署实施的审计监管事件作为一个准自然实验,利用多时点双重差分模型实证检验政府审计对国有企业并购和重大资产重组中业绩承诺可靠性的影响和作用机制。研究发现:(1)政府审计的实施能够显著提升国有企业并购重组业绩承诺的可靠性水平,这一结论在全部并购重组样本中和剔除业绩达标在5%以内的样本后均得到了有效验证,且经过多种稳健性和内生性检验后依然成立;(2)进一步的机制检验结果表明,政府审计能够通过“监督”效应和“增量”效应促进国企并购重组业绩承诺可靠性的提升,但并没有对未接受审计的同行业企业起到很好的“溢出”效应;(3)在业绩承诺到期后的经济后果上,政府审计显著提升了业绩承诺达标企业的长期绩效表现,同时降低了其商誉减值风险,但对于业绩承诺未达标企业的影响效果并不明显。

Taking the data of A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020 as a sample,this paper takes the audit supervision events implemented by the national audit office as a quasi natural experiment,and empirically tests the impact and mechanism of government audit on the reliability of performance commitment in SOEs M&A and major asset reorganization through multi-time point double difference model.The results show that:(1)The implementation of government audit can significantly improve the reliability of performance commitment of M&A of state-owned enterprises.This conclusion has been effectively verified in all M&A samples and samples excluding performance standards within 5%.And it is still established after a variety of robustness and endogenous tests.(2)Further mechanism test shows that government audit can promote the reliability of performance commitment of M&A of state-owned enterprises through its“supervision”effect,and“incremental”effect.However,it does not have a good“spillover”effect on the same industry enterprises that have not been audited.(3)In terms of the economic consequences after the agreed period of performance commitment,government audit significantly improves the long-term performance of enterprises with performance commitment,and reduces the risk of goodwill impairment.However,the impact on enterprises with performance commitment is not obvious.