审计委员会透明度与供应商/客户关系型交易

Audit Committee Transparency and Supplier/Customer Relationship Transaction

关系型交易的隐蔽性决定了公开信息披露的不透明。利用2013年上交所强制要求审计委员会披露履职信息的准自然实验,构建双重差分模型,考察提高审计委员会透明度是否以及如何影响上市公司与供应商/客户之间的关系型交易。研究发现,提高审计委员会透明度在短期内对供应商/客户关系型交易有促进作用,这可能与政策实施传递的可置信承诺有关,信息使用者更加信任企业的信息披露,但长期内这一促进作用有所减弱。进一步验证信任机制的作用发现,只有当企业位于法律环境较好、社会信任度较高的地区时,提高审计委员会透明度才有利于开展此类关系型交易。此外,审计委员会透明度提高通过促进供应链关系型交易缓解了企业融资约束。上述结论丰富了关系型交易在公司信息环境层面影响因素的研究,并为监管部门评估审计委员会改革实施效果提供了经验证据支持。

The confidentiality of relationship transactions determines the opacity of public information disclosure.Using the quasi-natural experiment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange mandatory disclosure requirements for audit committee duty performance information in 2013,and applying the difference-in-differences model,this paper examines whether and how the increased transparency of audit committee affects the supplier/customer relationship transactions of listed companies.The results show that the improvement of audit committee transparency has a positive effect on supplier/customer relationship transaction in the short term,which may be related to the credible commitment delivered by the policy,and information users have more trust in the information disclosure.In a long run,however,this effect has weakened.Further research shows that only companies in areas with a better legal environment or/and higher social trust,the increasing of their audit committee transparency can facilitate the supplier/customer relationship transaction,which verifies the role of trust mechanism.In addition,the increased transparency of audit committee eases corporate financing constraints by facilitating the supplier/customer relationship transactions.The above results enrich the study of the influence factors of relationship transactions at the corporate information environment level,and provide empirical evidence to evaluate the implementation effects of the audit committee information disclosure reforms.