不对等权力结构下竞争性闭环供应链的定价与回收决策

Pricing and Collection Decisions of Competitive Closed-loop Closed-loopSupply Chains with Unequal Power Pricing

供应链竞争已成为行业竞争的主要形式。针对两条权力不对等的竞争性闭环供应链,分别构建了制造商回收(M模式)、零售商回收(R模式)和第三方回收(T模式)三种回收模式下的博弈模型,求解得到不同模式的均衡价格、回收率、成员利润和链利润,然后将上述结果与权力对等的Nash均衡链进行对比,研究表明:在同种回收模式下,当链间竞争强度给定时,需求量、回收率、制造商利润、零售商利润和单链利润等绩效指标均表现出“先动劣势”和“后动优势”现象,即从链严格优于主链,Nash均衡链介于二者之间;随着双链竞争加剧,从回收模式选择视角,主从链的制造商利润、零售商利润和单链利润均从R模式过渡至M模式直到T模式最优。上述结论对处于不对等地位的两条竞争性闭环供应链的定价与回收决策具有借鉴意义。

Competition among supply chains has become the main form of competition in industries. For two competitive closed-loop supply chains with unequal market power, this paper establishes game models under three collection modes:manufacturer-collection(M mode), retailer-collection(R mode)and third party-collection(T mode) respectively, and then derive equilibrium prices, collection rates, profits of channel members and chain profits. The above results are compared with those in Nash equilibrium case that two chains have equal power. The conclusions show that for each collection mode,when the competition intensity is given, all the performance indicators such as market demands, collection rates and the profits of manufacturers, retailers and single chain exhibit the phenomenon of“first-mover disadvantage”and“second-mover advantage”, i.e., the follower chain is strictly superior to the leader chain, and the Nash equilibrium chain falls in between the two. Besides, with the intensification of two chains competition,from the perspective of collection mode selection, all the profits of manufacturers, retailers and single chain in the leader chain and the follower chain transfer from R mode to M mode until T mode is the optimal. The above conclusions can be used for reference to the pricing and collection decisions of two competitive closed-loop supply chains with unequal power.