电商平台下小微企业的融资与信息购买策略研究

Research on Financing and Information Purchase Strategy of Small and Micro Enterprises under E-commerce Platform

针对电商平台下市场需求信息的不确定性,建立由一个资金约束的供应商和电商平台构成的供应链系统,研究了电商平台的私有需求信息对供应链运营决策的影响,并利用委托代理理论设计了电商平台私有信息的购买机制。研究发现:当供应商未提出信息购买机制时,电商平台夸大需求信息会增加供应商的生产量从而增大其破产风险,所以理性的供应商并不会相信电商平台公布的需求信息;供应商能够通过设计满足激励相容约束的信息购买机制解决二者之间的信息不对称问题,并且提高了供应链整体的效益。

Aiming at the uncertainty of market demand information under e-commerce platform, a supply chain system composed of a capital constrained supplier and e-commerce platform was established, the influence of private demand information of e-commerce platform on supply chain operation decision was studied, and the purchase mechanism of private information of e-commerce platform was designed using principal-agent theory. The research finds that when the supplier does not put forward the information purchase mechanism, the e-commerce platform exaggerates the demand information, which will increase the production of the supplier and thus increase its bankruptcy risk. Therefore, rational suppliers will not believe the demand information published by the e-commerce platform. Suppliers can solve the problem of information asymmetry by designing an information purchase mechanism that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint and improves the overall benefit of the supply chain.