连锁董事与问询函监管——来自沪深交易所年报问询的证据

Interlocking Director and Inquiry Letter Supervision——Evidence from the Annual Report Inquiry of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges

以2014—2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本,检验连锁董事对问询函监管的影响。研究发现:连锁董事能有效降低上市公司被交易所发函监管的可能,而且这一关系通过减少上市公司内部控制缺陷和企业违规的概率来实现。进一步研究发现,交易所的问询函监管存在行业内的同群效应,连锁董事能有效降低上市公司连续多年被交易所发函监管的可能;股权集中度削弱了连锁董事与问询函监管的负相关关系;相比西部地区和高新技术企业,中东部地区和非高新技术企业中连锁董事与问询监管的负向关系更为显著。

Based on the sample data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2019, this paper examined the impact of interlocking director on the supervision of inquiry letter. The results showed that, interlocking director can effectively reduce the possibility of listed companies being regulated by being sent an inquiry letter of the exchange, and the action mechanisms here were reducing the internal control deficiencies of listed companies and lowering the probability of enterprise violations. Further research showed that, inquiry letter supervision had peer effects in the industry, and interlocking director can effectively reduce the possibility of inquiry letter supervision for several years. However, equity concentration has weakened the negative correlation between interlocking director and inquiry letter supervision. Moreover, compared with western regions and hightech enterprises, this negative relationship was more significant in central and eastern regions and non-high-tech enterprises.