摘要
引入前景理论并运用演化博弈理论,建立政府和污染企业的演化博弈模型,分析企业减排与政府监管之间的互动关系及影响因素,并运用MATLAB R2019a进行仿真分析。研究表明:提升政府监管力度会促进政企双方达到理想的稳定状态;提高单位减排量补贴标准能够促进企业减排,但补贴过高会阻碍政府积极监管;合理设置环保税税率对激励企业减排意义重大,政府对企业减排的环保税税率规定低于不减排税率,利于企业减排;对不减排行为执行更高的环保税税率能够限制企业污染排放,但会延长政府达到稳定状态的时间;当消极监管所感知的社会舆论成本达到一定程度时,政府会转为实行积极监管策略。因此,政府应采取积极的环境规制策略,提高减排补贴标准,完善环保税制,加强环保理念宣传,以形成企业减排、政府积极监管的良好局面。
Introducing prospect theory and using evolutionary game theory to establish an evolutionary game model between the government and polluting enterprises, analyzing the interaction and influencing factors between enterprise emission reduction and government supervision, and using MATLAB R2019 a for simulation analysis, the research shows that the improvement of government supervision will promote both government and enterprises to an ideal stable state;increasing the subsidy standard of unit emission reduction can encourage enterprises to reduce emissions, but excessive subsidies hinder the active supervision of the government;the reasonable setting of the environmental protection tax rate is of great significance to encourage enterprises to reduce emission, and the government’s environmental protection tax rate on emission reduction is set lower than the tax rate on non-emission, which is beneficial for enterprises to reduce emission;levying a higher environmental protection tax rate on non-emission enterprises can limit enterprise pollution emission, but it will prolong the time for the government to reach a stable state;when the perceived cost of social opinion from negative supervision reaches a certain level, the government will switch to implementing positive supervision strategies. Therefore, the government should adopt positive environmental regulation strategies, raise the standard of emission reduction subsidy, improve the environmental protection tax system, and strengthen the publicity of environmental protection concept, so as to form a good situation for enterprise emission reduction and active government supervision.
作者
王继光
胡玉尚
Wang Jiguang;Hu Yushang
出处
《常州大学学报(社会科学版)》
2022年第5期64-74,共11页
Journal of Changzhou University:Social Science Edition
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“考虑中断风险情境的供应链设施选址优化与协调研究”(16YJC630116)
山西省回国留学人员科研资助项目“山西省中小企业供应链合作运营绩效研究”(2017-008)。
关键词
前景理论
演化博弈
排污权
减排生产
环境规制
prospect theory
evolutionary game
emission right
emission reduction production
environmental regulation