摘要
认罪认罚从宽制度入法以来,我国逮捕率依旧居高不下。为解决现实问题,“少捕慎诉慎押”刑事司法政策应运而来。“少捕慎诉慎押”刑事司法政策能够有效应对认罪案件羁押率过高、认罪后轻刑逮捕等人权保障不足问题。政策推行过程中也存在较大的风险阻碍:僵化的法规范运行模式、检察机关大控方立场下的逮捕倾向,以及失衡的利益风险等因素导致政策推行错位。未来应把握好“少捕慎诉慎押”刑事司法政策在认罪认罚案件中的应用,完善政策深入推行的内生性激励机制;健全、强化认罪认罚案件中羁押替代性措施的适用;推进被追诉人社会危险性审查程序。
Since the leniency system of pleading guilty entered into the law system,the criminal arrest rate in China is still high.In order to solve the practical problems,the criminal justice policy of less arrest and prudent litigation and detention arises at the historic moment.The criminal justice policy of less arrest and prudent litigation and detention can deal with the problems of high detention rate and insufficient protection of human rights in criminal justice.There are also great risks hindering the implementation of the policy:such factors as the prosecution’s position,judicial liability and interest risk lead to the dislocation of policy implementation.In the future,we should grasp the application limit of the criminal justice policy of less arrest and prudent litigation and detention,implement the endogenous incentive mechanism of policy landing,strengthen and improve the application of alternative measures of detention in the case of pleading guilty and punishment and promote the social risk review procedure of the accused.
作者
兰梦茹
Lan Meng-ru(School of Law,Southwest China University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)
出处
《政法学刊》
2022年第5期90-99,共10页
Journal of Political Science and Law
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“刑事案件事实认定中的经验法则研究”(19BFX092)。
关键词
少捕慎诉慎押
认罪认罚
利益风险均衡
社会危险性证明
内生激励机制
Less Arrest and Prudent Litigation and Detention
Pleading Guilty and Punishment
Interest Risk Balance
Proof of Social Danger
Endogenous Incentive Mechanism