摘要
文章研究成本黏性与管理层自愿性盈利预测之间的关联。结果发现:成本黏性增加了管理层发布自愿性盈利预测的倾向及频率,同时,成本黏性程度与乐观盈利预测呈正相关,与悲观盈利预测呈负相关。影响机制表明,成本黏性通过提高信息不对称程度和企业经营风险影响了管理层自愿性盈利预测披露。进一步研究发现,政府补助加强了成本黏性与管理层自愿性盈利预测披露之间的关系,企业社会责任与经济政策不确定性削弱了两者之间的关系;然而政府补助、企业社会责任与经济政策不确定性对成本黏性与管理层自愿性盈利预测性质之间的关系没有显著影响。此外,成本黏性对管理层自愿性盈利预测的影响在非国有企业、非国际四大审计的公司中更为显著。最后,管理层自愿性盈利预测披露的增加,降低了权益资本成本,提升了企业价值。本文的发现丰富了成本黏性经济后果和自愿披露信息影响因素的研究,并提供了关于管理层的自由裁量权和管理激励在影响企业成本结构和盈利预测信息披露方面的证据。
The relationship between cost stickiness and management’s voluntary profit forecast were empirically studied.It is found that cost stickiness increases the tendency and frequency of management to issue voluntary profit forecasts.At the same time,the degree of cost stickiness is positively correlated with optimistic profit forecasts and negatively correlated with pessimistic profit forecasts.The impact mechanism shows that cost stickiness affects the voluntary earnings forecast disclosure of management by improving the degree of information asymmetry and business risks.Further research finds that government subsidies strengthen the relationship between cost stickiness and management’s voluntary earnings forecast disclosure,corporate social responsibility and economic policy uncertainty weaken the above relationship between the two.However,government subsidies,corporate social responsibility and economic policy uncertainty have no significant impact on the relationship between cost stickiness and the nature of management’s voluntary profit forecasts.In addition,the impact of cost stickiness on the management’s voluntary profit forecast is more significant in non‐state‐owned enterprises and non internationally audited companies.Finally,the increase in the disclosure of management’s voluntary profit forecasts has reduced the cost of equity capital and increased the value of the enterprise.The findings of this paper enrich the research on the economic consequences of cost stickiness and the influencing factors of voluntary disclosure of information,and provide evidence about the discretion and management incentives of management in influencing the disclosure of enterprise cost structure and profit forecast information.
作者
王秀丽
刘杨方姝
Wang Xiuli;Liu Yangfangshu(School of Accounting,Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics,Urumqi 830012,China)
出处
《技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第9期170-187,共18页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
新疆财经大学研究生科研创新项目“管理层盈余预测偏差与企业投资效率”(XJUFE2021K014)
新疆维吾尔自治区研究生科研创新项目“管理层盈余预测偏差与企业投资效率”(XJ2022G219)。
关键词
成本黏性
自愿性盈利预测
政府补助
社会责任
经济政策不确定性
cost stickiness
voluntary profit forecast
government subsidies
social responsibility
economic policy uncertainty