地方经济增长目标与企业金融化——异质性特征与政府激励结构破解

Local Economic Growth Target and the Corporate Financialization:Heterogeneous Characteristics and Cracking of Government Incentive Structure

地方经济增长目标管理是政府部门实现经济治理的重要手段,会对微观经济主体的生产和投资行为产生影响。文章基于上市企业2008—2020年数据,研究地方经济增长目标对企业金融化的影响、机制等问题。结果表明,地方经济增长目标会显著驱动企业金融化行为,尤其是对企业的短期金融化行为有明显助推作用,并由此降低了企业的经济绩效。特别地,地方经济增长目标对于不同属性企业产生了结构性的差异化影响。地方政府制度激励是影响地方经济增长目标效果的重要因素,在较强的经济绩效考核压力、较大的政府干预经济强度、较低的政府运作效率情境中,地方经济增长目标显著加剧了企业的金融化行为,但随着政府经济增长激励导向的转变,这种驱动企业金融化的趋势呈现出弱化特征。

Local economic growth target management is an important way for governments to achieve economic governance, and it will affect the production and investment behaviors of microeconomic entities. Based on the data of listed companies from 2008 to 2020, this paper studies the impact and mechanism of local economic growth goals on corporate financialization. The study found that the local economic growth target will significantly drive the financialization behavior of enterprises, especially their short-term financialization behavior, and thus reduce their economic performance. In particular, local economic growth goals have structurally differentiated effects on enterprises of different attributes. A further study indicates that local government institutional incentives are an important factor affecting the effectiveness of local economic growth goals. In the context of strong economic performance assessment pressure, government intervention in the economy, and low government operation efficiency, local economic growth goals serve to significantly intensify the financialization of enterprises. However,with the government’s incentive orientation for economic growth shifts, this tendency shows reclining characteristics.This paper provides important clues to understanding the Chinese government’s economic governance and the changes in institutional incentives, carrying important implications for optimizing government behavior and guiding the transformation of real enterprises from real economy to virtual economy.