摘要
人工数字顾问业务存在着较大的负外部性问题和信息不对称等问题,也涉及广大投资者的利益即公共利益,需要监管机构予以监管,包括市场准入管理即牌照管理。传统的金融市场准入通常考虑资本、股东、人员、经营场所与业务设施、风险管理与内部控制等,甚至会考虑股东资格等,它们并不完全适合于数字顾问,需要根据数字顾问的特点作出相应的调适,具体包括经营场所的灵活化,增加对信息技术治理和数据治理的要求,以及对人工智能系统进行检测等等。欲实施数字顾问的市场准入,可以采取监管沙箱机制。
The digital advisory business has negative externalities and information asymmetry. It also involves the interests of investors-the public interest. It needs supervision by the regulatory agencies, including market access management-license management. Traditional financial market access usually considers capital, shareholders, personnel, business premises and business facilities, risk management and internal control, and even considers shareholder qualifications. These are not entirely suitable for digital advisors, and need changes based on the characteristics of digital advisors. The market access system should be adjusted accordingly, including increasing the flexibility of the business premises, the requirements for information technology governance and data governance, and the detection of artificial intelligence systems. To implement market access for digital advisors, the regulation sandboxing mechanism can be adopted.
出处
《暨南学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第9期67-81,共15页
Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“大数据法制立法方案研究”(18ZDA136)。
关键词
人工智能
数字顾问
投资顾问
监管沙箱
市场准入
artificial intelligence
digital advisor
investment advisor
regulation sandbox
market access