正义的不平等——论罗尔斯分配正义理论的另外一个部分

Inequality of Justice: On the Other Part of John Rawls’ Theory of Distributive Justice

罗尔斯的分配正义理论由两个部分组成,一个是“民主的平等”,另外一个是“正义的不平等”,而后者一直没有受到研究者的应有重视。罗尔斯的“正义的不平等”观念可以分为两个方面:一个方面是消极的和论战性的,即对应得观念的批判;另外一个方面是积极的和建设性的,即论证一种正义的不平等是如何可能的。在论证正义的不平等时,罗尔斯提出了两个核心观念,即“合法期望”和“资格”。“合法期望”基于制度规则,而“资格”基于个人行为,两者共同解释了一种不平等的分配如何能够是正义的和可辩护的。

John Rawls’ theory of distributive justice is composed of two parts that I coin as the“equality of democracy”and the“inequality of justice.”The latter has not been fully studied. John Rawls’ conception of“inequality of justice”includes two sides: one is a criticism of the idea of deservingness in a negative and controversial manner;the other is an argument in a positive and constructive manner on how the part“inequality of justice”is possible. In discussing the concept“inequality of justice, ”John Rawls further proposes two important concepts: legitimate expectation and entitlement.The former is based on institutional regulations, and the latter, on individual actions.These two concepts explain how unequal distribution can be justified.