连锁股东能降低并购超额商誉吗?

Will Cross-ownership Reduce Excess Goodwill?

本文基于2007~2019年我国沪深A股上市公司样本,探究连锁股东对并购超额商誉的影响,结果发现:连锁股东能有效降低并购超额商誉,并且在连锁股东数量多的上市公司中抑制作用更加明显,该结论经多项稳健性检验后依然成立。机制检验发现,连锁股东可通过监督效应和信息效应抑制超额商誉。进一步分析发现,连锁股东持股比例越高,其对并购超额商誉的抑制作用越强;在被国内“十大”事务所审计的企业和行业竞争程度较高的企业中,连锁股东对并购超额商誉的抑制作用更有效;连锁股东能有效降低商誉减值的可能性。

Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in China from 2007 to 2019,this paper explores the influence of cross-ownership on excess goodwill.It is found that cross-ownership can effectively reduce excess goodwill,and the inhibition effect is more obvious in listed companies with a large number of cross-ownership.After a number of robustness tests our conclusion is still valid.Examining its impact mechanism,it was found that cross-ownership could suppress excess goodwill through supervision effect and information effect.Further analysis found that the higher the shareholding ratio of cross-ownership,the stronger the inhibitory effect on the excess goodwill.It is found that in the national“Big 1o”and enterprises with a high degree of industry competition,cross-ownership have a more effective inhibitory effect on the excessgoodwill;cross-ownership can effectively reduce the possibility ofgoodwill impairment.