市场势力、排他性交易与平台竞争

Market Power,Exclusive Dealing and Platform Competition

2019年以来,关于排他性交易的经济效应和规制政策都存在较大争议.在Armstrong等理论模型基础上,构建并分析市场势力差异化情形下的平台排他性交易模型,旨在为双边平台排他性交易竞争效应提供合理的经济学解释以及反垄断政策依据.研究表明:1)当市场势力较强的平台实施排他性交易时,排他性激励能强化该平台对双边用户的定价优势,扩大其商家用户规模,进而增加其与市场势力较弱的平台间的利润差距.2)当市场势力较弱的平台实施排他性交易时,排他性激励能弥补其与市场势力较强平台在对双边用户议价能力与用户规模上的差距,超过一定阈值时,可反超市场势力较强平台的利润.最后,结合研究结论和平台经济发展实践,为平台治理和反垄断规制提出政策建议.

Since 2019,there have been great controversies about the economic effects and regulatory policies of exclusive dealing.On the basis of Armstrong and other theoretical models,this paper constructs and analyzes the platform exclusive dealing model under the situation of market power differentiation,aiming at providing a reasonable economic explanation and anti-monopoly policy basis for the competitive effect of bilateral platform exclusive dealing.The research shows that:1)When the platform with strong market power implements exclusive dealing,exclusive incentives can strengthen the pricing advantage of the platform for bilateral users,expand the scale of its business users,and then increase the profit gap between the platform and the platform with weak market power.2)When the platform with weak market power implements exclusive dealing,exclusive incentives can make up for the gap between the platform with strong market power and the platform with strong market power in bargaining power and user scale,and surpass the profit of the platform with strong market power when it exceeds a certain threshold.Finally,combined with the research conclusion and the development practice of platform economy,it puts forward policy suggestions for platform governance and anti-monopoly regulation.