不对称信息下考虑排污权交易的污染第三方治理契约设计

Design of a Third-party Pollution Governance Contract Considering Emissions Trading under Asymmetric Information

第三方治理模式是治理环境污染的重要探索,实现了“谁污染,谁治理”到“谁污染,谁付费,第三方治理”的转变。但在实际推广过程中,第三方环保服务企业良莠不齐,缺乏有效监管,且与排污企业间存在责任界定难、合同制定难等问题。鉴于此,通过探索污染第三方治理和排污权交易制度的结合,给出针对不同治理能力治污方的两部式甄别契约,同时对比不同政府补贴方式下的契约效果。研究表明:可通过契约设计达到甄别目的,普通治污方仅获得保留效用,而高水平治污方还将获得额外利润,契约中的具体参数受预期行业中两种治污方占比影响。此外,对排污方和治污方的补贴都会提高治污方治污努力程度,增加排污方和高水平治污方利润,且同等补贴比例下补贴排污方效果更显著。

The third-party governance model is an important exploration in the treatment of environmental pollution. It has realized the transformation from“who pollutes,who controls”to“who pollutes,who pays,and third-party governs”. However,in the actual promotion process,the thirdparty environmental service companies(called“EC”hereafter) are uneven. They lack effective supervision,and have difficulties in defining responsibilities and contracting with polluters. In view of this,by exploring the combination of third-party governance and emissions trading system,a two-part screening contract for EC with different governance capabilities was given,and the contract effects under different government subsidies were compared. Research shows that the screening purpose can be achieved through contract design. The ordinary EC will only obtain the reserved utility,while the high-level EC will obtain additional profits. The specific parameters in the contract are affected by the proportion of ordinary EC and high-level EC in the expected industry. In addition,subsidies to polluters and EC will enhance pollution control efforts and increase the profits of polluters and highlevel EC. Moreover,the effect of subsidizing polluters under the same subsidy ratio is more significant.