中国农地改革中的产权细分、权利配置与行为激励

Property Right Subdivision, Right Allocation and Behavior Incentive in Farmland Reform in China

中国的农地改革过程中不断对农地产权进行细分,然后配置给相应的组织或者农民,而权利的获得或者改变会对相应的当事人产生一定的激励,导致不同的行为。通过对农地改革三个阶段的研究,发现不同的阶段具有不同的产权细分特征,细分出来的农地权利需要进行配置,不同的权利配置会产生不同的激励,农民会表现出不同的行为。农民获得更多的权利有利于增大农地的价值。这些可以解释农地改革的成败。

In the process of farmland reform in China, farmland property rights are constantly subdivided and then allocated to the corresponding organizations or farmers. The acquisition or change of rights will generate certain incentives for the corresponding parties and lead to different behaviors. Analyzing the three stages of farmland reform, it is found that different stages have different characteristics of property rights subdivision, and the subdivided farmland rights need to be allocated. Different rights allocation will produce different incentives, and farmers will show different behaviors. More rights for farmers will increase the value of farmland. These may explain the success or failure of farmland reform.