建筑垃圾的非法处理风险及多主体监管策略——基于深圳建筑垃圾堆放场重大滑坡事故的分析

Risks of Illegal Disposal of Construction Waste and Its Multi-agent Supervision Strategy:Based on the Analysis of the Big Landslide Accident of Garbage Dump Site in Shenzhen

随着我国城市化进程的加快,建筑垃圾处理成为一个前所未有的紧迫问题。通过演化博弈模拟,研究了政府-企业-社会治理系统的演化规律,并以深圳市建筑垃圾填埋场“12.20”特大滑坡事故为例进行了仿真分析。结果表明,风险策略的经济效率、社会监督的力度、政府的惩罚力度以及非法废物处置的成本系数都对多方演化博弈模型有显著影响。因此,要实现对建筑垃圾处置的有效监管,政府就应建立社会监督机制,加大社会监督力度,加大政府处罚力度,降低垃圾处置企业的风险收益。

With the acceleration of urbanization in China,the disposal of construction waste has become an unprecedented and urgent problem.Through the evolutionary game simulation,the evolution law of the government-enterprise-social governance system is studied,and the simulation analysis is carried out by taking the“12-20 Shenzhen Construction Waste Landfill”as an example.The results show that the economic efficiency of the risk strategy,the intensity of social supervision,the government’s punishment and the cost coefficient of illegal waste disposal all have a significant impact on the multi-party evolutionary game model.The conclusion is that in order to effectively supervise the disposal of construction waste,the government should establish a social supervision mechanism,increase social supervision,increase government punishment,and reduce the risk and benefit of waste disposal enterprises.