碳中和约束下绿色财税政策耦合机制研究

Research on Coupling Mechanism of Green Fiscal and Tax Policies under the Constraint of Carbon Neutrality

本文构建了绿色财税政策与长期经济增长的理论模型,研究了环境保护税和绿色财政政策的耦合机制。研究发现,在无配套政策情形下,环境保护税对经济增长的影响呈现“倒N型”,而对污染排放的影响呈现“倒U型”,即过高或过低环境保护税税率均存在“增长陷阱”或“污染陷阱”;单一绿色财政政策不能“熨平”环境保护税制陷阱,低环境保护税税率下绿色研发补贴、生产者绿色价格补贴和消费者绿色价格补贴依次存在“增长陷阱”“污染陷阱”和“增长陷阱”;但在生产者绿色价格补贴和绿色研发补贴构成的绿色财政支出组合中,生产者绿色价格补贴所占比重在20%~40%之间时,对环境保护税制陷阱的“熨平”效果最佳。因此,恰当的绿色财税政策组合的优化配置对当前中国环境治理政策的设计至关重要。

The paper constructs a theoretical model of green fiscal and tax policies,and simulates the existence of trap of environmental protection tax system and“ironing mechanism”of green fiscal policy.The research finds that in the absence of supporting policies,there are obvious tax traps when the environmental tax is too high or too low.The environmental protection tax policy under the guidance of single subsidy policy is still faced with the limitation of environmental protection tax rate.Furthermore,the environmental protection tax policies oriented by the green R&D subsidies,producer green price subsidies and consumer green price subsidies are exposed respectively to“growth trap”,“pollution trap”and“growth trap”under the circumstance of the low environmental protection tax rate.However,in the green fiscal expenditure portfolio consisting of producers green price subsidies and green R&D subsidies,when the proportion of producers green price subsidies is between 20%and 40%,the environmental protection tax policy will coordinate the development of economic growth and environmental governance to the largest extent.Therefore,the green fiscal policy has an obvious“ironing”effect on the trap of environmental protection tax system.The proper allocation of green fiscal and tax policies is crucial to the design of China’s environmental governance policies.