董事网络联结与政府补助获得

Board Network Ties and Government Subsidies Acquistion

本文立足董事网络联结这一社会资本视角,考察其对公司政府补助获得的影响。本文以2004—2017年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究显示:(1)董事网络联结密度越大,公司的政府补助获得水平越高;(2)区分公司的产权性质后,这一促进作用主要存在于非国有企业,在国有企业中并不显著;(3)区分公司所在地的政府干预强度后,这一促进作用主要存在于政府干预强的地区,在政府干预弱的地区并不显著;(4)独立董事网络联结与非独立董事网络联结对于公司获得政府补助均具有正向影响,此外董事网络联结对于公司获得政府补助的概率与水平均具有促进作用。本文的发现不仅拓展了政府补助获得影响因素的研究,推进了董事网络特征影响公司价值的路径研究,而且也为公司构建社会网络与政府完善政策制度提供了一定的启示。

From the perspective of social capital,we examine the influence of board network ties on a firm’s ability to obtain government subsidies.Using A-share listed firms from 2004-2017 as the sample,we find that:(1)the greater the density of board network ties,the more government subsidies the firm attains;(2)in the aspect of ownership of the firm,the facilitation effect mainly exists in non-state-owned firms but does not exist in state-owned firms;(3)in the aspect of the degree of government intervention in the areas where the firm is located,the facilitation effect mainly exists in areas with strong government intervention but does not exist in areas with weak government intervention;(4)both the network ties of non-independent directors and independent directors have a positive impact on government subsidies acquistion.In addition,board network ties promote the probability and the level of the firm’s government subsidies acquistion.This paper enriches the studies of the determinants of government subsidies acquistion,and advances the research on the path that the characteristics of board network promote the value of the firm.In addition,it also provides some enlightenment for the construction of corporate social network and the improvement of policies and institutions.