摘要
债券信用评级中发行人付费模式与投资者付费模式孰优孰劣的问题是国内外持续争议的焦点。基于2007—2015年中国信用评级数据和发债融资数据,本文研究发现:对于相同对象,发行人付费模式下的信用评级明显高于投资者付费模式。通过度量信用评级偏差发现,两种模式分别存在评级高估偏差或低估偏差。在双重信用评级模式中,投资者付费模式带来的评级压力没有显著改变发行人付费模式的信用评级偏差,但是债券融资利率显著低于单一制的发行人付费模式下的债券融资利率,主要原因是双重信用评级提供了更多维度和内容含量的评级信息,因而能够更好地降低信息不对称和减少非道德问题。本文建议发债企业优选双重信用评级模式,必要时配合投资者付费模式的评级机构,并提示监管机构重视两种付费模式分别存在的评级高估或低估问题。
The question that whether issuer-pay mode is better than investor-pay mode or not is controversial in theory and practice.Basing on the sample data of China’s bond credit rating from 2007 to 2015,this paper finds that the credit rating for the same issuing firm given by the credit rating agency(CRA)with issuer-pay mode is significantly higher than that given by the CRA with investor-pay mode;By measuring the credit rating deviation,it is found that the issuer-pay mode and investor-pay mode has overestimation or underestimation respectively.In the sample with dual credit rating mode,the benchmarking rating pressure from the investor-pay mode does not significantly change the rating deviation under the issuer-pay mode,but the bond interest rate under dual credit rating mode is significantly lower than that under the single issuer-pay mode,mainly because the dual credit rating provides more dimensional and content information,which can better reduce information asymmetry and immoral problems.This paper suggests that bond issuers should choose the dual credit rating mode,cooperate with the rating agencies with investor pay mode when necessary,and remind the regulators to pay attention to the problem of overestimation of ratings under the issuer-pay mode and underestimation of ratings under the investor-pay mode.
作者
陈关亭
朱松
连立帅
GUANTING CHEN;SONG ZHU;LISHUAI LIAN
出处
《中国会计评论》
2021年第4期637-660,共24页
China Accounting Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71372047)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(18YJA630156)
北京市自然科学基金面上项目(9192017)的资助。