闭环供应链锦标激励机制研究

Research on Incentives of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on the Rank-order Tournament

为提高供应链的激励效能,基于锦标制度和多任务委托代理模型,考虑了代理人业绩的关联性差异,分析和比较了多任务不同关联情形下激励效能的差异。结果表明:在锦标制度中,零售商更关注高报酬和低报酬之间的差异;如果两项委托任务的成本函数相互独立,则多任务激励机制就转化为单任务激励机制;如果两项委托任务成本函数相互替代,制造商对回收任务的最优激励差额要小于零售商只承担该任务时的最优激励差额,且最优激励差额随着回收效益、绝对风险规避程度、以及不确定性的增加而降低。

In order to improve the incentive efficiency of the supply chain,based on the rank-order tournament and the multi-task principal-agent model,the correiation difference of agent performance is considered,and the difference in incentive efficieucy under different correhation scenarios of multi-task is analyzed and compared.The results show that:In the trophy system,the retailers pay more attention to the difference between high reward and low reward;if the cost functions of the two delegated tasks are independent of each other,the multi-task incentive mechanism is transformed into a single-task incentive mechanism;if the cost functions of the two entrusted tasks are replaced by each other,the manufacturer's optimal incentive difference for the recycling task is smaller than the optimal incentive difference when the retailer only undertakes the task,and the optimal incentive difference decreases with the increase of recovery benefit,absolute risk aversion degree,and uncertainty.