领导策略、追随偏好与欧盟的气候领导力

Leadership strategies,follow-up preferences and EU’s climate leadership

欧盟自京都时期就多次在全球气候治理中发挥领导作用,但欧盟气候领导力并非始终能够延续下去。欧盟的领导策略与其追随者的偏好之间的互动结果很大程度上决定了欧盟领导力出现的这种变化。当欧盟采取硬策略,追随者倾向于结果型偏好时,欧盟获得气候领导力的可能性较大;当欧盟采取硬策略,追随者倾向于适当型偏好时,欧盟获得领导力的可能性较小;当欧盟采取软策略,追随者倾向于结果型偏好时,欧盟获得领导力的可能性较小;当欧盟采取软策略,追随者倾向于适当型偏好时,欧盟获得领导力的可能性较大。这一过程所反映的是追随者对欧盟的战略影响作用,追随者可以同欧盟展开策略性博弈以影响欧盟的气候战略,也可以通过学习欧盟的气候政策产生积极的协同作用。

The EU has played a leading role in global climate governance since the Kyoto Protocol era,but the EU ’ s climate leadership has not always been able to continue. An analysis of the EU’s interaction with its followers in climate practices shows that changes in EU climate leadership depend on whether the EU’s leadership strategy incorporates follower preferences into account,resulting in two kinds of interactions:inclusive preferences-active following leadership,and non-inclusive preferences-passive resistance weak leadership. This process reflects the role of followers in restricting the EU,and followers can engage in a strategic game with the EU to influence the EU’s climate strategy,or they can create positive synergies by learning from the EU ’ s climate policy. If the EU wants to maintain its climate leadership,the key lies in strengthening communication and consultation with other climate governance actors and in reasonably defining the limits of the use of leadership strategies.