制造商承担社会责任的绿色供应链政府补贴机制

The government subsidy mechanism in a green supply chain with the manufacturer assuming social responsibility

本文以一个绿色制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,考虑终端消费者绿色偏好意识,探究制造商承担社会责任及政府对制造商实施补贴对供应链运作的影响。首先,以无政府补贴为基准情形,探讨了制造商承担社会责任与否对绿色供应链运作的影响,研究发现制造商承担社会责任有助于提高产品绿色度和绩效价格比,并能增加市场需求和改善零售商的经济收益,但是会导致更高的零售价格并损害制造商的经济收益。随后,在政府补贴情形下,本文考虑制造商承担社会责任,探究了绿色度补贴和绿色研发创新成本补贴两种补贴机制对绿色供应链运作的影响,发现满足一定条件时,合理的政府财政补贴有利于激励制造商进一步提升产品绿色度,并改善各成员的经济收益,且零售商的经济收益会随制造商承担社会责任水平和政府补贴的增加而增大,出现“搭便车”行为。最后,基于相同的财政补贴支出,本文对比两种补贴机制的优劣,发现绿色研发创新成本补贴在提高产品绿色度、增加市场需求和提高绩效价格比方面更加出色,但是会导致更高的零售价格。算例研究发现,制造商承担社会责任以及政府补贴均有助于提高社会福利;在相同的财政补贴支出下,消费者绿色偏好意识及政府补贴力度的提高均会增加两种补贴机制效果的差异,消费者、零售商和政府偏好绿色研发创新补贴,而制造商偏好绿色度补贴。

It is an important condition for enterprises to undertake social responsibility,respond to the demands of stakeholders actively,and promote the sustainable development of economy,society and environment so as to achieve high-quality economic development.In green supply chains,manufacturers who are responsible for the production of green products are often faced with the situation of lacking funds or technology,which will greatly affect their enthusiasm for green production.In order to deal with the development obstacles of green production,government′s financial subsidies are indispensable.Taking a green supply chain composed of a green manufacturer and a retailer as a research object and considering consumers′green preference consciousness,this paper discusses how the manufacturer′s social responsibility and different government′s subsidy mechanisms could affect the green supply chain,and evaluates the effects of different subsidy mechanisms under the same government expenditure.First,taking the non-government subsidy as a benchmark,we construct game models under two situations,i.e.,the manufacturer undertakes or does not undertake social responsibility.The parametric conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium solutions under two situations are given.Then,the sensitivity analysis of social responsibility level is made based on the equilibrium results.We find the improvement of manufacturer′s social responsibility level is helpful to improve product greenness,and increase market demand and consumer surplus.Meanwhile,it is beneficial to improve retailer′s economic benefits and manufacturer′s overall benefits,but it will lead to the increase of retail price and damage manufacturer′s economic benefits.Subsequently,considering government subsidies for the manufacturer who undertakes social responsibility,we introduce two subsidy mechanisms,i.e.,greendegree and green-R&D-innovation-cost subsidy.By rewriting manufacturer′s profit function,game models under two mechanisms are constructed and their equilibrium solutions are proved to exist and be unique under certain parameter conditions.Through the sensitivity analysis of government′s subsidy coefficient and manufacturer′s social responsibility level,we find that government subsidies can motivate the manufacturer to develop and manufacture green products,and thus improve product′s green degree.With the increase of government subsidy coefficient,product′s green degree,performance-price ratio,market demand,retailer′s economic benefits and manufacturer′s overall benefits are constantly increasing.The government′s financial subsidies,to some extent,cannot fully compensate the cost brought by manufacturer′s social responsibility.However,appropriate financial subsidies are more conducive to improving manufacturer′s economic benefits.Even if the government does not give financial subsidies to the retailer and the retailer does not undertake social responsibility,retailer′s economic benefits will be improved with the increase of government′s subsidies and manufacturer′s social responsibility level,which results in“free-rider”behavior.Therefore,the government can levy a certain percentage of taxes on the retailer to balance the benefits of supply chain members.Moreover,the operational efficiency of the two subsidy mechanisms are compared and analyzed based on the same financial expenditure.It is found that the green-R&D-innovation-cost subsidy mechanism is better in improving product greenness,increasing market demand,and enhancing performance price ratio and retailer′s economic benefits,but it will lead to a higher retail price.Conversely,the green-degree subsidy mechanism has more advantages in improving the economic benefits and overall benefits of the manufacturer.Finally,through the analysis of a numerical example,we find that both manufacturer′s social responsibility and government′s subsidies can improve social welfare.The improvement of consumers′green preference awareness and government′s subsidies will increase the difference between the two subsidy mechanisms.Consumers,the retailer and the government prefer the green-R&D-innovation-cost subsidy,while the manufacturer prefers green-degree subsidy.In addition,under the government subsidy mechanism,this paper only considers the manufacturer′s social responsibility and assumes the wholesale market faced by the manufacturer is a free competition market.In the future,it can be extended to the situation where the manufacturer and the retailer share the social responsibility,and the wholesale price is an endogenous variable.